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ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical 
practice and ontology. Putnam’s 1971 book Philosophy of Logic came one year later than Quine’s homonymous 
volume. In the first section, I compare these two Philosophies of Logic which exemplify realist-nominalist view-
points in a most conspicuous way. The next section examines Putnam’s views on modality, moving from the 
modal qualification of his intuitive conception to his official generalized non-modal second-order set-theoretic 
concept of logical truth. In the third section, I emphasize how Putnam´s “mathematics as modal logic” departs 
from Quine’s “reluctant Platonism”. I also suggest a complementary view of Platonism and modalism showing 
them perhaps interchangeable but underlying different stages of research processes that make up a rich and dy-
namic mathematical practice. The final, more speculative section, argues for the pervasive platonistic concep-
tion enhancing the aims of inquiry in the practice of the working mathematician.
Keywords: Putnam, Quine, Logic, Indispensability, Ontology, Scientific Language, Mathematical Practice.
RESUMEN: Este artículo estudia la concepción de Putnam de verdad lógica que emana de su visión de la práctica de la 
matemática y de su ontología. Philosophy of Logic, el libro de 1971 de Putnam surge un año más tarde que el 
homónimo de Quine. En la primera sección, se comparan estas dos Filosofías de la Lógica que ejemplifican los 
puntos de vista del realismo y del nominalismo de modo conspicuo. La siguiente sección examina el enfoque 
de la modalidad de Putnam, que va desde la cualificación modal de su caracterización intuitiva de validez ló-
gica a su concepción oficial generalizada no-modal conjuntista de segundo orden. La tercera sección subraya el 
modo en que «la matemática como lógica modal» de Putnam se distancia del «Platonism a regañadientes» 
de Quine. Aquí se sugiere una visión complementaria del Platonism y del modalismo, los cuales, aunque quizás 
intercambiables, se muestran subyaciendo a los diferentes estadios del proceso de investigación de una práctica 
de la matemática rica y dinámica. La sección final, más especulativa, conjetura algunas razones de la persistente 
concepción platónica implícita en la práctica del matemático.
Palabras clave: Putnam, Quine, Lógica, Indispensabilidad, Ontología, Lenguaje Científico, Práctica de la Matemática.
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Introduction
This paper focuses on Putnam’s philosophy of logic and mathematics. Specifically, I ex-
amine his conception of logical truth, which is based on his view of mathematical prac-
tice and ontology. His conception can be seen as an endorsement of the mathematical 
paradigm of contemporary model theory framing a general picture of mathematics and 
the natural sciences. Even though his 1971 presentation is philosophical, in it Putnam 
emphasizes what can be thought of as an official view of logic as a mature scientific dis-
cipline. However, by considering Putnam’s overall view of logic and science as expressed 
in his different writings, we can see that he never loses sight of the idea that mathemati-
cal logic, as part of mathematics, is also an applied science. For example, some form of a 
moderate scientific holism emanates from his remark that “the internal success and coher-
ence of mathematics is evidence that it is true under some interpretation, and that its in-
dispensability for physics is evidence that it is true under a realist interpretation” (Putnam 
1979/85b, 74). On the other hand, he (Putnam 1994a, 464) qualifies his overall coop-
erative picture of science by paying attention to the diversity of sciences involving com-
munal rational practices with no formalizable unique method. Moreover, Putnam (2012, 
188) reminds the reader that in his 1979/85b mathematics was considered quasi-empir-
ical “within mathematics itself”. Furthermore, he also agrees with Parsons (1979-80, sec-
tion III) in showing “concern that the obviousness of basic mathematical statements is left 
out unaccounted for by the Quinean picture”. The same observation was made to include 
logical principles by the Corcoran (1979, 1237-8) review in connection with Quine’s un-
explained force of basic reasoning: “In the reviewer’s opinion these views are attractive but 
more discussion of the obviousness of logical axioms and of the visibly soundness of rules of 
inference would be desirable”. This suggests that one trait of Putnam’s conception enter-
tains an intended balance between the local and the global at the time of assessing the co-
operative spirit among different scientific domains, ranging from mathematics and phys-
ics on the one hand, to more “extreme cases” (Putnam 1994a, 463), such as, Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection, relativity theory, and quantum mechanics. Thus, Putnam’s 
naturalism is not like Quine’s, at least to the extent that he recognizes that the universe 
of discourse of a science may countenance things that neither can be properly discussed in 
a canonical first-order language nor do they require the whole machinery of science to be 
tested. This view also evolves towards Putnam’s later modal proposal for the formulation 
of scientific principles avoiding Quine’s commitment to abstract objects and disclosing a 
different view upon indispensability arguments (Putnam 2012, 182). He also recognizes 
that logic plays a crucial role in the way our interaction with our environment has ena-
bled our survival and amassing of knowledge through experience, hypothesis-testing and 
prediction. Putnam (1968) thinks that logic is empirical in the sense that logical theory 
could turn out to be false for empirical reasons. Contrary to Quine, however, he thinks 
that the success of our logical theories is ultimately sustained by the existence of an objec-
tive reality that goes beyond sensory experience and the mere concern for the grammar of 
language. Logic and mathematics, according to Putnam, are about an objective reality, of 
which equivalent descriptions can be given within different conceptual frameworks. In 
the end, it is tempting to conjecture that his views constitute a sort of compromise be-
tween logic and mathematics on the one hand, and the best account of the role these play 
in general scientific knowledge on the other.
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Putnam’s Philosophy of Logic
Putnam’s 1971 Philosophy of Logic came just one year later than Quine’s book with the 
same title. Some aspects of the two philosophies of logic exemplify the nominalist and real-
ist viewpoints in a most conspicuous way.
The style of presentation of Putnam’s 1971 Philosophy of Logic reveals a clear inten-
tion to argue in favor of the most plausible understanding of a realist conception of logic by 
showing the shortcomings of nominalist strategies. His rhetoric is compact, although en-
dowed with some pedagogical license. On page 27, Putnam endorses the view that logic is 
concerned with general principles, such as:
“For all classes S, M, P: if all S are M and all M are P, then all S are P.”
The conception of logical validity that emerges from this core example favors the choice of 
dealing with logical truth rather than logical consequence. However, this decision has im-
portant philosophical ramifications. Briefly, in any finite universe of sentences, logical im-
plication can be defined on the basis of logical truth, and viceversa. The option chosen is of 
no technical or philosophical significance: P logically implies c if and only if the conditional 
whose antecedent is the conjunction of the sentences in P and whose consequent is c, is log-
ically true. However, the issue has import when considering infinite universes of sentences 
(perhaps not even closed under conjunctions and conditionals). Clearly, not every text ex-
pressing a first-order argument admits of a suitable one-sentence translation in a standard 
language. Specifically, no such text with an infinite set of premises allows a single-sentence 
translation. Of course, Quine bypasses this issue by calling on the compactness of first-or-
der logic. Putnam’s higher-order logic, however, is not compact; so one is inclined to con-
sider his presentation focused on logical truth as a kind of pedagogical license.
The important point is that such a formulation leaves no doubt that expressing logi-
cal validity requires a universal quantifier ranging over classes or sets. Let us call this con-
ception of validity “contemporary setism”. We should note that setism presupposes ontol-
ogy of sets provided by the underlying set-theory adopted in the semantic definition of the 
logical properties of our logic. Let me point out at the outset some interesting features of 
Putnam’s conception.
Logical validity in Putnam’s picture is extra-linguistic or language transcendent. To be 
precise, in his account, logical validity is predicated on general truths of set theory. It is not, 
for example, the interpreted sentence “If all men are rational beings and all rational beings 
are mortal, then all men are mortal.” that is a logical truth in his conception, but rather the 
corresponding generalized set-theoretic (material) truth quoted above. Appealing to the 
contrast with nominalism, we may recall that Quine (1970/85) holds that in order for a 
sentence to be logically true, it is necessary and sufficient for it to be true and to remain true 
under any uniform lexical substitution of its content-terms. Since, intuitively speaking, the 
relation of a sentence to its lexical substitutions is a matter of grammar, then logical truth 
is thus a matter, as Quine emphasizes, of grammar and truth. Now, Putnam is quick to 
point out that the nominalist strategy makes logical truth relative to a previously specified 
class of logical constants in a given interpreted first-order language. Furthermore, at least 
in the case of Quine, the interpretation of the language is kept fixed and no changes to the 
extensions attached to the non-logical terms are allowed. So in this respect, the nominal-
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ist, and Quine in particular, thinks that logical truth is relative to the means of expression 
of a given language. In this syntactic or intra-linguistic view, as opposed to the Putnam’s al-
ready mentioned extra-linguistic view, changing the language changes the concept of logical 
truth involved. In this sense, Quine’s concept of validity is immanent, whereas Putnam’s is 
transcendent (see Quine 1970/86, 19-29). Thus, according to Quine, as Putnam correctly 
criticizes, given two languages, we have two concepts of logical truth which share in com-
mon that each of their interpretations is kept fixed. Perhaps this seems ahistorical, to say 
the least. Tarski, in his seminal 1936 paper on consequence, cogently argued that his se-
mantic or extra-linguistic conception was superior to the syntactic or intra-linguistic con-
ception. In effect, it is at least conceptually possible for there to be a sentence in a given 
language that does not have an instance of a lexical substitution (or a counter-variant, fol-
lowing Quine’s terminology) due to the limited means of expression in that language. Such 
a sentence would be rendered as a logical truth in the language, with the result of over-gen-
eration of the intuitively adequate validity class.
We should not overlook the fact that in Putnam’s conception of validity, a concep-
tion which, as mentioned above, follows the main trend in contemporary model theory, it 
is irrelevant whether the language is interpreted or not. Specifically, interpretations are set-
theoretic objects: elements of the universe of pure sets. Again, this view presupposes ontol-
ogy of sets. Validity is predicated on a second-order universal set-theoretic sentence and it 
amounts to the nonexistence of a certain sort of set that provides for a counter-interpreta-
tion or counter-model. Similarly, invalidity amounts to the existence of a set that provides 
for such a counter-model. Of course, the natural question arising here is whether there are 
enough sets to supply suitable counter-interpretation domains for every invalid sentence.2 
Besides, as it is argued in the concluding remarks of my 1997 paper, this reductionist move 
of logical truth to set-theoretic (plain) truth involves a kind of ontological circularity, since 
logic is traditionally understood as the science underlying all the sciences, including set-the-
ory. Putnam thus seems to endorse a debatable identification of a logical property (logically 
necessary truth) with material (plain truth) of the particular science of sets.
Nevertheless, one may be inclined to say that Putnam’s proposal is superior to Quine’s 
because the range of his variable in the validity principle appears to be wider since it appeals 
to all classes, whereas Quine appeals to all lexical substitution instances in L. However, this 
is not so, at least not for the case of a first-order language capable of expressing elementary 
arithmetic with identity as non-logical. To see that every sentence in a first-order language of 
arithmetic is logically true in the substitutional sense if and only if it is logically true in the 
model-theoretic sense, we can proceed as explained in what follows. The conditional from 
left to right can be established by contraposition. Suppose that a given sentence, F, of the 
language is not a logical truth in the model-theoretic sense. Then F has a counter-model; 
and so by the Löwenheim theorem, F has a counter-model in the universe of natural num-
bers. Now, by the Hilbert-Bernays theorem, the arithmetical predicates involved in this in-
terpretation can be defined in the language.3 Hence, every non-logically true sentence has a 
2 Kreisel 1967 is the classical locus discussing the tension between our pre-formal intuitions and our for-
mal or set-theoretic models representing them. See specially section 2 in connection with logical valid-
ity. See also footnote 4 below.
3 Quine (1954) explains and proves the Hilbert-Bernays result, showing its role for my present purposes.
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counter-variant obtained by suitable substitution of its content terms by arithmetical ones. 
The conditional from right to left follows from the (weak) completeness of first-order logic. 
Any sentence that is logically true in the model-theoretic sense is deducible by means of 
some standard calculus, which by virtue of its soundness only generates true sentences un-
der all substitutions.4 However, Putnam follows the tradition established by Frege, Russell, 
Bolzano and Tarski in which logic is higher-order and he would not hesitate in consider-
ing Quine’s view restrictive since first-order logic is a proper sub-logic of virtually every logic 
used as an underlying logic in the classical mathematics and science literature. Of course, 
Quine (1950/82, 259-260) had to “borrow furniture” from the Platonic realm, since he rec-
ognizes that sciences require classes for their intelligibility. Nevertheless, for the case of first-
order logic, Quine’s parsimonious ontology welcomes the avoidance of sets.
Putnam (1971,5) emphasizes that the example of validity given above, namely: “For all 
classes S, M, P: if all S are M and all M are P, then all S are P.” on its modern interpretation 
just expresses the transitivity of the relation of subclass. He emphatically adds that “this is 
a far cry from what traditional logicians thought they were doing when they talked about 
Laws of Thought and terms” Of course, Putnam (1971, 3) is well aware of the historical 
fact that “the methods used in logical research today are almost exclusively mathematical 
ones”. Putnam clearly acknowledges that the principles of classical logic do not change even 
though a new domain of investigation, such as quantum mechanics, may suggest the inter-
est of exploring a non-classical logic for that particular domain. He recognizes that what 
does change is our comprehension of the classical properties. In short, Putnam is aware that 
there is general agreement concerning whether a given statement is (classically) valid or 
invalid, but disagreement about the proper understanding of that validity.
As Corcoran (1973b) indicates, current mathematical logic can be taken to be an ap-
plied branch of mathematics that produces model-artifacts resembling logical principles 
which underlie mathematical practice. The “material” for the model is provided by string 
theory for the syntax and by set-theory for the semantics, thereby generating standards of 
well-formed formulas and logical validity. So far, so good. However, even though the math-
ematical character of logic is as well established as any other mathematical discipline such 
as physics or chemistry, the set-theoretic reduction suggested in the semantics raises two 
problems. The first is whether some versions of set-theory contain only true principles. 
Particularly, some philosophers and mathematicians have shown concern regarding less 
evident axioms that imply the existence of large cardinals (see Boolos 1998). Second, if the 
principles of set theory are true, then either they are materially true or their truth involves 
some kind of necessity. In the first case, as already mentioned, validity would be dependent 
of plain truth about sets. In the second, validity would be dependent on a kind of necessary 
(mathematical) truth, which I believe some logicians would take to be weaker than logi-
cal necessity.5 In other words, prima facie, the realm of mathematical possibility seems to 
4 The alleged co-extensionality of Quine’s substitutional account with the model-theoretic is discussed 
and put into question in Eder (2016) following and expanding an argument developed in Boolos 
(1975).
5 See, for example Corcoran’s 1972 paper “Conceptual Structure of Classical Logic”, where the author al-
ready cast doubts on the material adequacy of Tarski’s model-theoretic concept of logical consequence. 
He suggests that Tarski might have considered a necessary condition for validity to be both necessary 
and sufficient: “What I am suggesting is that there might well be an argument (P, c) which is invalid but 
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be smaller than the realm of logical possibility. Perhaps the offshoot of this predicament is 
that a mathematical logic, or in other words, a mathematical analogue of a logic—whether 
real or putative—cannot tell us what the nature of validity is but rather only what validity 
is like by providing a proxy representation. Certainly, this suggestion could follow the lines 
of Putnam’s defense of the empirical character of general mathematics, and logic in particu-
lar. However, Putnam does not tell us if the data for mathematical logic are general princi-
ples emerging from the structure of the world or rather examples of reasoning as exhibited 
in particular domains of investigation. On this score, he sometimes seems to favor a view 
of logic as formal ontology in the sense of Russell when he proposes quantum logic for the 
underlying logic of that particular empirical realm.6 Standard principles studied by logic as 
formal ontology are excluded middle and non-contradiction. On the other hand, logic has 
been also understood as grounding formal epistemology by focusing on reasoning and the 
way we process information from initial premises or principles by means of deduction. It 
must be said that Putnam also refers to logic as the science of reasoning in this sense but in 
my opinion there are no definite grounds to settle this issue. Finally, it should also be em-
phasized that Putnam’s official conception of validity is non-modal. There is no trace or 
hint of modality in the foregoing second-order formulation of validity.
Back and forth with modalities
Despite of the closing remark of the previous section we should not overlook the fact that 
Putnam’s pre-formal understanding of validity shows explicit modal wording seemingly ex-
pressing an unofficial modal conception. For example, the reader finds in some of the 1971 
Putnam’s criticism of the nominalist reductive strategy evidence of his modal qualifications 
of validity, which according to him, cannot be accommodated by the nominalist. The intu-
itive or underlying sense of validity that he appeals to in these passages is explicitly modal; 
for, he says that the nominalist cannot afford the intended idea of validity as truth under all 
possible substitution instances in all possible formalized languages. However, the official op-
tion that Putnam endorses for logical validity is generalized non-modal second-order set-
theoretic truth as pointed out above. In short, Putnam’s pre-formal conception of validity 
is modal, whereas his favorite formal conception de-modalizes validity by means of a purely 
quantificational account. This suggests that even though Quine rejects modal notions tout 
court while Putnam does not, both understand—at least officially—logical properties as 
different forms of generalization.
for which there is no (re)interpretation making the premises true and the conclusion false. In any case, 
according to the Tarskian definition of validity, the invalidity of an argument depends on the existence 
of a suitable domain and there might not be enough domains to provide counter interpretations for all 
invalid arguments”. So Corcoran, anticipated today’s debate on what he first called “Tarski’s thesis” in 
clear reference to the analogous way in which people discuss Church’s thesis. In addition, the class of 
set-theoretic domains of interpretation clearly determines the range of modal possibility built on that 
class. A fortiori, this suggests that logical necessity may surpass the kind of necessity provided by the set-
theoretic machinery. This line of argument is also taken up by Etchemendy in his 1990 book.
6 Russell (1919/93, 169) says that “logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though 
with its more abstract and general features”.
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During the 1970s, Putnam’s explicit views on modalities change. However, as I have 
indicated, this modal standpoint was not new to Putnam’s thinking, since it was already 
clearly present in 1967b. In his Philosophy of Logic (1971), Putnam shows a pre-formal mo-
dal conception of logical truth; whereas for his formal presentation, he removes modali-
ties in favor of a pure extensional set-theoretic conception. As in many other areas of phi-
losophy, the possible influence of Quine’s rejection of a modal notion is one to consider as 
background to this. As Shapiro (2000a, 238) indicates: “The general program is to demur 
from talk of necessity and possibility, replacing it with talk of abstracts objects like sets and 
numbers”. Putnam (1979/85b, 70) describes this move by saying that “mathematics got 
rid of possibility by simply assuming that up to isomorphism anyway, all possibilities are si-
multaneously actual—actual, that is, in the universe of sets”. I have said that for the case of 
model theory, in his 1971 book, this move amounts to de-modalizing Putnam’s own intui-
tive view of logical truth. His next explicit position (1979/85b, 70) was to recover a modal 
discourse for mathematics in general, in order to propound a realist conception by empha-
sizing its objectivity but avoiding commitments to the existence of mathematical objects. 
His main thrust seems “to bring some comfort to the Platonist”, who is usually in some 
trouble when it comes to explaining our epistemic access to abstract entities.
The new modal standpoint now embraced is that “mathematics has no objects of its 
own at all”. As Shapiro (2000a, 243-244) emphasizes, modal mathematics makes “a subject 
with no object” in clear reference to the title of the 1997 Burgess and Rosen’s influential 
book. The idea is that mathematics lacks a proper or specific universe of (actual) objects to 
count as its own subject-matter. The proposal is to substitute existential assertions in favor 
of modal assertions, such as: “certain things are possible and certain things are impossible”. 
To back up this anti-Quinean mathematics-as-modal-logic account, Putnam points to the 
development of modal logic and possible-worlds semantics: “It seems to us that those phi-
losophers who object to the notion of possibility may, in some cases at least, simply be ill-
acquainted with physical theory, and not appreciate the extent to which an apparatus has 
been developed for describing ‘possible worlds’.” Presumably, Putnam is referring here to 
the power of possible-worlds semantics.
Now, if mathematics lacks objects of its own, then what is the difference between 
mathematics and logic? Logic has traditional been said to be the science preceding other 
sciences which lack a specific domain, or a neutral topic. If we consider possible worlds 
to furnish an account of the modal conception of validity, then we have that in order for 
a sentence to be logically true, it is necessary and sufficient for it to be true in every pos-
sible world. If this view of logical truth is explained by reference to possible-worlds se-
mantics, then we end up relying on set-theoretic structures of a distinct mathematical 
nature. Needless to say, possible worlds raise fundamental questions concerning their on-
tological nature that make them controversial.7 Ultimately they rely on some substantive 
background ontology that provides the material from which to build up “logical spaces”, 
namely, set-theoretic structures. I suggest calling Putnam’s view so sketched “structural 
modalism”.
7 However, in other papers, Putnam offers different interpretations of possibilities in terms of the state 
spaces adopted in probability theory or the phase spaces of physics. I thank an anonymous referee for 
pointing out Putnam’s alternative choices for depicting possibilities. 
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Certainly the idea that a science such as mathematics lacks objects of its own was not 
new. Putnam’s general picture of his 1967a was influenced by the structural approach to 
geometry found in Hilbert’s 1899 Grundlagen and Dedekind’s 1888 structural account of 
arithmetic.8 On this view, mathematics is not about any particular object, but about ob-
jects of any sort which structured in some appropriate way satisfy the given axioms. This 
approach became highly influential in the early twentieth century, even though it departed 
from the more traditional view that mathematicians divide their labor and typically work 
in specific domains of research. In general, the domain of a given science is its subject-mat-
ter or genus in the Aristotelian sense of the word. In the Posterior Analytics 76b10, Aristotle 
says that each science requires three things: its genus, its basic concepts and its basic princi-
ples. The idea that each science has a subject-matter or domain is so entrenched that virtu-
ally every basic textbook says that the domain of elementary arithmetic is the class of natu-
ral numbers; the domain of geometry is the class of points; the domain of string theory is 
the class of all strings; the domain of set theory is the so-called universe of sets; etc.
Now, what price does structural modalism have to pay in order to avoid Platon-
ism with respect to actually existent abstract objects? First of all, Putnam (1979/85b, 71) 
clearly indicates that “the notion of possibility does not have to be taken as a primitive in 
science” since we can “define a structure to be possible (mathematically speaking) just in 
case a model exists for a certain theory, where the notion of a model is the standard set the-
oretic one”, thus taking the notion of set as basic and the notion of possibility as derived. 
He also supports the reverse direction, treating “the notion of possibility as basic and the 
notion of set existence as the derived one”. Here the slogan states: “Sets are permanent pos-
sibilities of selection” (Ibidem). Clearly Putnam subscribes to the view that the existential 
and the modal expression of mathematical propositions are just equivalent descriptions. 
He indicates that the structural modal account is useful to understand that one can express 
the same mathematical fact (whatever that is) without the need of appealing to abstract ob-
jects. In addition, he indicates in this connection that there are “real puzzles, especially if 
one holds a causal theory of reference in some form, as to how one can refer to mathemati-
cal objects at all. I think, that these puzzles can be clarified with the aid of modal notions”. 
In my opinion, what Putman accomplishes with the modal turn is certainly bypassing the 
Platonist’s difficulty in explaining the issue of accessibility to abstract entities.
Putnam (2012) points out that his modal view is worked out in detailed in Hellman’s 
1989 book, where the project of a modal structuralist conception of mathematics is devel-
oped. Hellman’s project makes mathematics logical to the extent that the realm of possibil-
ity in which his program is nested is neither physical nor metaphysical, but logical. Under 
this modal proposal, a mathematical statement, A, has to be translated into or rewritten in 
a modal second-order language stating that for every possible structure of the appropriate 
kind, A would hold in that structure. Clearly, this modal paraphrasing and rewriting avoids 
direct quantification over mathematical entities. Thus, Hellman’s intended project is elim-
inative providing a non-Platonist approach avoiding set-theoretical formulations. Putnam, 
on the other hand, simply indicates that the modal formulation has now a proper develop-
ment which was only sketched in his 1971 book. This is consistent with taking the modal 
structuralist description as one equivalent description of the objectual (contrary to Hell-
8 Again, my thanks go to an anonymous referee for bringing up this important historical point. 
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man’s intentions) but with no epistemic or ontological priority.9 In the end Putnam’s phi-
losophy appears to be inclusive of both types of discourse in science, objectual and modal, 
whereas Hellman’s philosophy is eliminative and thus exclusive.
The natural question arising concerns the nature of logical modalities. Putnam’s sup-
port of the development of modal logics leads us back to the set-theoretic nature of pos-
sible worlds. Clearly, under what I have already termed contemporary “setism”, a possi-
ble world is a set-theoretic structure; a set, for that matter. Hence, in order for a sentence 
to be logically possible, it is necessary and sufficient for there to be a set which satisfies the 
given sentence. In turn, according to the present program, the existential clause that there 
is such a set is to be modalized accordingly. The threat of circularity is evident. If the idea is 
to avoid or bypass sets, modalizing existential statements via possible worlds leads back to 
the set-theoretic ontology. Shapiro (2000a, 275) reports that Hellman accepts this circu-
larity objection and “he demurs from the standard model-theoretic accounts of the logical 
modalities”. Hellman’s way out is to take logical modal notions as primitive: not reducible 
to set-theory. Of course, we may feel that we are left here with a mystery surrounding a very 
rich primitive logical notion, to say the least.
The search for complementary views of mathematical practice
It is difficult to offer sensible arguments that resolve the present debate between Platonism 
and modalism. Quine and Putnam agree that it would be dishonest to deny the existence of 
values for the quantificational variables. However, while Quine appears as a reluctant Pla-
tonist, admitting that even a soft science such as zoology requires the existence of classes, 
Putnam, appears to be a non-Platonist who is somehow comforted by his modal logic turn. 
Quine’s ontological commitment welcomes abstract entities as values of the bound varia-
bles of scientific discourse while his web of beliefs does not harbor modalities at all. In con-
trast, Putnam’s philosophical choice entertains an overall model of science that involves 
modalities that release pressure on commitments to objects. The present discussion makes 
evident that these two authors, Quine and Putnam, held different conceptions of logic 
with implications for the status of their respective views on the so-called indispensability 
arguments. In the received view, Quine and Putnam were identified in defending this in-
fluential argument which holds that successful science amply employs mathematics and to 
the extent that we consider science as true, mathematics as part of it, must also be true. This 
in turn leads to the conception that true mathematics requires the existence of mathemati-
cal entities. Contrary to Colyvan’s (2004) reduction of these two views to the one he calls 
the Quine-dash-Putnam indispensability argument, which is explicitly rejected in Putnam 
(2012: 181-83), we have suggested above that there is already enough evidence in their 
respective philosophies of logic to sustain two conceptions with emergent implications 
for their assessment of indispensability arguments: that of Quine and that of Putnam.10 
Putnam’s modal turn reduces the weight that the indispensability argument is supposed to 
 9 I am indebted to my reviewer for framing this interpretative point.
10 See also D. Liggins (2008), who arrives at the need to distinguish the two views on indispensability 
based on a careful interpretation of Quine and Putnam preventing an oversimplified discussion of a 
unique indispensability view.
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carry in favor of Platonism. The intention is advancing a form of new compromise realism 
that follows the lines of the objectivity of mathematics, as we encounter in Kreisel (1967), 
as opposed to the role of the existence of objects. This is such that —according to Putnam 
(1971: 57)— it would allow intellectual honesty to be recovered by those defenders of the 
indispensability of quantification over abstract entities who live ill at ease with Platonism.
Historically, Platonism appears to be the older tendency within the philosophy of 
mathematics whereas modalism appears to have a shorter and more recent development. 
To be more precise, the present debate seems to be between setism—as the present realiza-
tion of the Platonist tendency—and modalism. Moreover, Putnam (1979/85, xii) qualifies 
Platonism as “a research program; not something fixed once and for all but something to 
be modified and improved by trial and error”, a traditional philosophy of mathematics en-
dowed with an epistemological theory and an ontology.11 Parsons (1990, 289) also suggests 
Putnam as the inventor of modalism clearly indicating its recent arrival in the philosophy 
of mathematics often in connection with some form of structuralism.
From a sociological standpoint of the working mathematician Platonism appears more 
influential in the current philosophy of mathematics than modalism. Along these lines, 
Parsons (1967/72, 201) affirmed that Platonism “is the dominant attitude in the practice 
of modern mathematicians”. However, Putnam’s modalism also leads an important ten-
dency within contemporary mathematics that can be traced as far as back as Zermelo’s in-
fluential paper of 1930.
The idea of having equivalent descriptions must surely prompt us to uncover the ellip-
sis: description equivalent of what? The problem is to clarify what they are descriptions of 
if this can be only given in one of those descriptions. An interesting analogy can be found in 
Tarski (1929, 27), when he indicates that the science of Euclidean geometry can be formal-
ized by taking the domain to be either the class of points or the class of solids. The fact of 
the matter is that in either case, there are appropriate primitive concepts in terms of which 
the usual geometrical concepts can be constructed. For example, Pieri (1908) provides a 
system of geometry whose primitive terms are “point” and the three-place relation “equi-
distance”; and Tarski himself gives a set of postulates whose primitive terms are “sphere” 
and the two-place relation “being a part of”. For practical reasons, we could agree that these 
are just different formulations of one and the same science. However, if we take ontology 
seriously, the domains of these formalizations are different and hence there is a theoretical 
sense in which these two sciences are different.
Putnam (1967b, 72) also indicates that his view embraces that “the chief characteris-
tic of mathematical propositions is the very wide variety of equivalent formulations that 
they possess […] in mathematics the number of ways of expressing what is in some sense 
the same fact (if the proposition is true) while apparently not talking about the same ob-
jects is especially striking”. Unfortunately, I could not find a clear sense of the word ‘propo-
sition’ in Putnam’s discussions. He often predicates truth of statements instead of proposi-
tions. A statement is usually understood as an ordered pair composed of a sentence and its 
intended interpretation. On different occasions he predicates truth of assertions, which are 
usually taken to be the result of a pragmatic act. A proposition on the other hand, has tra-
ditionally been understood as being abstract and providing the meaning or the interpreta-
11 See also Putnam (1979/85b, 72).
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tion of a sentence. What does exactly mean for a proposition in this sense to have differ-
ent equivalent formulations? Consider by way of tentative illustration the case of the 1931 
Gödel’s axiomatization of arithmetic, whose universe of discourse is restricted to the class 
of natural numbers. In this framework the proposition that one is a number is a tautology 
to the effect that one is an existing [number]. On the other hand, in the 1889 Peano’s pres-
entation of arithmetic the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of all individuals. 
In this framework the proposition that one is a number is an atomic non-tautological prop-
osition to the effect that one is a numerical individual. Finally, take the Whitehead-Russell 
formalization in the hierarchy of types based on the universe of all [logical] individuals. In 
this framework the proposition that one is a number is a proposition to the effect that the 
class of all of the singletons belongs to the numerical class. It is not easy to see in what sense 
there is one and the same proposition here instead of three different propositions expressed 
in the languages of different frameworks. Putnam does not provide for a workable identity 
criterion for propositions to elucidate this issue. At any rate, the point is that prima facie 
the propositional content of these three arithmetics is not the same. Likewise, the about-
ness provided by their respective different universes of discourse is also different display-
ing different underlying ontologies: a Gödel number is specific, a Peano number is an indi-
vidual and a Whitehead-Russell number is a logical class of equivalent classes. The message 
here is that the universe of discourse (of a given discourse) is important in determining 
which propositions are expressed by which sentences and every such a discourse has an un-
derlying ontology to be considered. This situation calls for a basic equilibrium between am-
plifying the scope to attain the global and lessening the depth to attain the local within our 
aims of inquiry.12 The trouble with these cases is how to transfer the lessons of the equiva-
lent formulations of objectual mathematics to the realm of the present philosophical de-
bate between Platonism and modalism.
In this connection I would also like to suggest that mere attribution of pragmatic 
equivalence of the thing and the modal languages in ordinary scientific parlance may also 
disregard the historical, and perhaps even the epistemic priority of a thing-language over a 
modal language. This is not to deny the complementariness of these two ways of present-
ing mathematical results but to point out that the sense in which scientists discuss equiva-
lent formulations may sometimes fail to consider the onto-epistemic genesis of our alleged 
equivalent theories. Some so-called “applications” are prior to others, and they are indica-
tors of the time and the epistemic dependent goals of a given science. The aims behind such 
priority should not be overlooked and may need to be brought to light if the modal struc-
tural philosophy becomes prevalent. In short, possible equivalent formulations are identi-
fied from previous realizations of—in some unspecified sense—the very same theory and 
these are distinctively referential. The suggestion I am making here is not to disregard the 
fact that a given science is often identified not only with its true propositions, but also with 
its dynamic epistemic goals and the pragmatic considerations involved in its development 
12 The scenario shown in these arithmetical examples opens up the contemporary debate of the so-called 
incompleteness of mathematical objects; i.e., the issue of whether there is a fact of the matter to prop-
erly answer the question for the identity of the “ones” in these three arithmetics. The topic deserves a 
paper on its own but the reader can follow the present debate in MacBride (2005) which surveys a de-
tailed and clear discussion of the influential views of Resnik and Shapiro on the matter, along the lines 
of their respective structuralist conceptions of mathematics.
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which seem to be entangled with certain background ontology as it was illustrated above. 
In some cases at least, it seems rather unnatural to detach these considerations from the 
characteristic subject-matter or aboutness of particular mathematical theories and its asso-
ciated metaphysics. It seems also natural to think of abstracting form particular concrete ar-
ithmetical systems so as to be able to discuss possible structures whose realizations are those 
prior particular systems. As Shapiro (2000a, ch. 10) also discusses and illustrates, cognitive 
psychology sustains an analogous process of pattern recognition responsible for the learn-
ing process of the identification of possible structures and the abstraction process underly-
ing the type-token distinction. Be that as it may, history of mathematics and ontogenesis 
seem —prima facie and roughly— to support an analogous evolving process of modal and 
structuralist abstraction from prior concrete realizations.13 Hellman’s eliminative modal 
structuralism wants to avoid the classical epistemological problem of existence of abstract 
objects by discussion of systems which are logically possible. To a certain extent it may be 
arguable the sense in which Putnam’s modalism is structural but certainly it is not elimina-
tive. Holding the objectual or the modal picture, he says, is often determined by which of 
the equivalent formulations of the mathematical propositions the mathematician takes to 
be as primary. He also insists (1971, 75) that “none of these approaches (objectual or mo-
dal) should be regarded as more true than any other; the realm of mathematical fact admits 
of many ‘equivalent descriptions’”.14
Mathematics, its knowledge and practice
At first sight, knowledge of mathematics and applied logic seems to presuppose differ-
ent kinds of knowledge involving not just propositional knowledge or knowing-that, but 
also operational knowledge or knowing-how. These two also seem to presuppose essen-
tial knowledge of. For example, in order to know that no square number is a double square 
number in the universe of positives, it is necessary to know how to square: how to raise a 
number to its second power. Likewise, knowing how to square seems to require knowledge 
of numbers, presumably some kind of experiential acquaintance with whatever it is we call 
numbers. The Platonist makes the most straight forward interpretation of the previous de-
scription of mathematical experience taken knowledge of to be primary and knowing how 
to be in some sense operational or manipulative.15 We can even picture a non-logicist Pla-
tonist describing her mathematical experience involving heuristics of hypothesis discovery 
as well as apodictic of proofs. For such a Platonist having a pre-formal proof is as good as 
having a formal one. The former is epistemic while the latter reconstructs in a formal sys-
tem what has already been attained. A successful realization of the axiomatic method is in 
13 Contemporary structuralism do not seem to wave the need for objects in its ontology, namely struc-
tures, whether in their ante rem conception of characterizing a pre-existing structure or in their in re 
conception, characterized as an equivalent class of actual or possible systems. See Shapiro (2000a, chap-
ter 10) for a detailed and perspicuous discussion of this distinction.
14 Putnam (1967b, 45) credits Reichenbach with the happy expression ‘equivalent descriptions’. Putnam 
often uses the expression ‘equivalent formulations’ instead.
15 See Corcoran and Sagüillo (2018, sec. III.3, especially n. 24).
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this sense one way (among several) of organizing already available knowledge.16 To an im-
portant degree some of these features are found in Putnam’s (1979/85b) quasi-empirical 
characterization of mathematics where the emphasis is made on hypothesis discovery and 
quasi-empirical testing of hypothesis by means of the hypothetic-deductive method, a ven-
erable tradition that Putnam identifies in Polya’s elaborated methodology of plausible rea-
soning. Here Putnam (ibidem 61) attempts to show “that even the elementary theory of 
non-negative integers is not a priori” without denying of course that mathematics is more a 
priori than physics and making thus a case for the relativity of the a priori/a posteriori epis-
temic dichotomy. One important conclusion Putnam draws in this connection (ibidem 76) 
is the essential complementariness of the method of proof and what he calls quasi-empirical 
inference.
Putnam (1971) was also clear that the nominalist option of stripping our scientific 
language of all reference to non-physical entities was not available, perhaps hardly even 
conceivable. Adding the dilemma of causal interaction with numbers and sets leads to 
Putnam’s modal proposal.17 It should be recalled that the transition from the thing-lan-
guage to the modal-language is mediated with an intermediate stage of abstraction intro-
ducing structures. Putnam (1967b, 48-49) would insist that there are different systems of 
arithmetic, for example those mentioned in the previous section above, all three exhibiting 
the same structure of an omega sequence. In this connection, Corcoran (1992, sec. 5) dis-
cusses the historical antecedents of the 1931 Gödel axiomatization of arithmetic which he 
depicts as a modern characterization of a structural deductive system which was based on 
the previous underlying logic of Principia, which itself, was reflecting the deductive prac-
tice developed by Peano and Dedekind in the same field of number theory and by Veblen 
in geometry. Shapiro (1997, ch. 5) also traces a historical account of mathematics casting 
doubts that the changes brought about by structuralism in the 19th century could support 
the hypothesis that previous research strategies of ancient mathematicians going back as far 
as Thales were searching for knowledge of abstract structures instead of abstract things. He 
also discusses the case of geometry which exemplifies a transition from the mathematician’s 
perception of it as a theory of real space to its contemporary structural model-theoretic var-
iant interpretation. In the face of this well-known episode of the development of funda-
mental branches of mathematics it seems hard not to acknowledge some form of an objec-
tual commitment in the ordinary talk and practice of the founders of the initial systems of 
arithmetic and geometry.
It also appears that the issue of not taking language at face value and consequently the 
need to rewrite scientific language, allegations Putnam makes against the nominalist, could 
also by applied to Putnam’s modalism itself. After all, his stance seems to propose a non-
trivial rewriting of scientific language taking explicitly and seriously modal notions and 
bypassing direct or literal existential commitments. Indeed, the issue is not merely rhetor-
ical. Taking the language of science literally seems in many cases to be a matter of interpre-
tation. We find the Platonist looking at scientific practice where the modalist aims to be 
16 Ibidem sec. III.6.
17 Incidentally, Parsons (1990, n. 36) makes it clear that Putnam was not convinced that the modal op-
tion of eliminating mathematical objects was in “all respects clearer or more fundamental than taking 
mathematical language at face value as referring to mathematical objects.”
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more sophisticated about the way we read and write what mathematicians “really” do. The 
fact of the matter is that many philosophers and mathematicians of a classical persuasion 
regularly talk of and quantify over abstract entities without any sense of being dishonest, or 
of being particularly eccentric, or in discomfort.18 Consider for example, the (honest) intel-
lectual testimony of George Boolos in his 1998 paper “Must We Believe in Set Theory?” In 
that paper, Boolos restates a basic trait of rationality in the need for evidence in belief for-
mation. Contrary to Gödel, Boolos, cast doubts on some of the axioms of set-theory. He 
clearly points out that some basic axioms are reasonably obvious, but that some others are 
far from being so evident. Boolos claims that axioms implying the existence of large cardi-
nal numbers definitely do not “impose themselves upon us” showing clear disagreement 
with Gödel’s (1947/89, 483-84) famous assertion to the contrary. Is Boolos dishonest for 
not committing himself to the existence of such large sets, despite the fact that his compe-
tent discussion of set-theory presupposes an underlying classical logic with objectual quan-
tification? Of course not; much less does his responsible competence with set-theory imply 
that there is the need to eliminate certain mathematical objects in favor of modalities, even 
though modal paraphrasing is always a choice? Working mathematicians may honestly cast 
doubts on certain existential statements, but this does not necessarily make them modal-
ists (neither tout court fictionalists for that matter). Granted, there are different degrees of 
deflating or inflating scientific language, but again, linguistic practice—including canoni-
cal formalization—seems supervenient on other material scientific practices that are typi-
cal of a dynamic context of discovery. Prior to speaking and writing properly the mature 
language of science—whether objectual or modal—the need arises for a good metaphysics 
for the intellectual enterprise that has formed the goals and the historical progress of a sci-
ence. In the end, honest scientific practice is the practice of a rational believer. Dynamic re-
search indicates that a believer, whether an individual or a community of thinkers, holds 
not just different metaphysical beliefs, but also entertains them with different epistemic in-
tensities, according to the available evidence. Accordingly, the Quinean web of belief con-
tracts and expands when we drop an old belief or add a new one. In short, we can change or 
reinforce our beliefs depending on the evidence and our web of belief is dynamic and con-
stantly subjected to change and adjustment to recover equilibrium. In this sense—contrary 
to Quine—it is perhaps time to acknowledge that our web of belief is not “uniform and 
seamless”.19 The ideal of having different areas of research with different domains working 
together supplying an overall picture of knowledge and prediction should then be accom-
modated to particular tasks in specific areas of research. We philosophers clearly witness 
how different metaphysical tensions pull at the seams in the web. Here, the compromise 
needed is to be tolerant in the local if we want to allow for unavoidable licenses and simpli-
fications in the global; and this seems to be both the payoff from and the price of Putnam’s 
objectual and modal alleged equivalent readings of scientific statements.
18 Likewise, it is acknowledged by many Platonists that our present conceptual and experiential back-
ground does not yet provide us with an adequate accessibility account of the borders and the relations 
between concreta and abstracta. On this account Putnam (1979/85b, 60) grants the referentiality of 
mathematical statements; i.e. that there is something denoted by expressions as ‘set’ and ‘function’ but 
denying that “reality is somehow bifurcated”.
19 See especially Shapiro (2000a, 337) and Maddy (2005, 456-58) on ways in which the scientific enter-
prise does not seem to adjust to Quine’s holistic picture.
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Perhaps there is something after all that may work in the philosophy of mathematics—
pace Putnam’s 1994 honest but pessimistic title. Metaphysical pluralism would do the job 
if we think that different philosophies of mathematics—Platonism and modalism for in-
stance emphasize different aspects and research processes within a rich and historically 
framed mathematical practice. The suggestion here is to concoct an heterogeneous and dy-
namic conception of mathematics (mathematical logic included). Detailed analysis requires 
philosophical compromises. Perhaps the issue between Platonism and modalism should 
not be presented as a debate of antagonistic philosophies defended by the very same phi-
losopher at different times and perhaps in different domains of research. By way of analogy, 
Tarski, held an ideal logicist picture of arithmetic while being an empiricist with respect to 
string theory. Mutatis mutandis there should not be any objection for a mathematician en-
tertaining the object picture in some field while holding the modal picture in another mod-
ulo their context and historical development.
If mathematical practice grants this scenario then definitional equivalence of Platon-
ism and modalism about the same domain of research does not seem to be the only condi-
tion that really matters for the history and philosophy of mathematics. Modalism requires 
prior contentual non-modal results if Aristotle’s dictum mentioned above is to be made 
good. In other words, modalism may mask the historical fact that specific domain applica-
tions are onto-epistemically distinguishable by the Platonist.20 In a way, modalism, despite 
Putnam’s insistence on mere truth-value equivalence, appears supervenient on Platonism, 
perhaps it is a Wittgensteinian ladder that a modalist must discard. Putnam himself recog-
nizes, for example, that: “Many of the physicist’s methods (variational methods, Lagrangian 
formulations of physics) depend on describing the actual path of a system as that path of all 
the possible ones for which a certain quantity is a minimum or maximum”.
Granting that “possible” is a fully legitimate notion in many fields, we tend to see these 
two philosophies, Platonism and modalism, as complementary (not just compatible neither 
necessarily antagonistic) in the practice of many (realist) working mathematicians when-
ever the onto-epistemic transition from a thing-language to a modal-language has been 
possible. Historical practice suggests that assigning successive roles to these two types of 
mathematical discourse could in the end show them to be compatible and equivalently in-
terchangeable. However, definitional equivalence should not mask the fact that many con-
temporary mathematicians feel at home thinking derivatively of modalities thanks to the 
primitive robust acknowledgment of the semantic paradigm of set-theory. It is also worth 
recalling that by dint of avoiding talk of specific objects, Putnam modalism erases any 
trace of ontological costs characteristically linked to the range of the variables in a given 
language. He qualifies his view saying that “Of course, one can strain after objects if one 
wants” by looking at different interpretations. But again this overlooks the historical fact 
that an intended model of a theory has—in addition to a specific domain of objects—an 
epistemological privileged role in the dynamics of a science. Of course, this is not to deny 
but to supplement Tarski’s (1941/94, 117) dictum that “as far as the construction of our 
20 Of course, I am not contemplating here any massive error that would justify a radical historical revi-
sion. Mathematical practice has change to a certain extent introducing new standards of rigor and clar-
ity. But I tend to see this move as an evolving process within a more or less implicit but not neatly de-
fined platonistic philosophical framework underlying the practice of the working mathematician.
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theory is concerned, this [intended] model has no distinguished place with the totality of 
models”. The final remark is that overlooking the historical development of concrete reali-
zations of a theory can enhance modalism with a sense of possibility which may well erase 
any trace of the role of time and experience in the development of a science. Again, some 
models are prior to others and the intended interpretation of a theory carries a characteris-
tic subject-matter or domain of objects pointing out the platonistic underpinnings of a pri-
mary mathematical practice.
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